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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Antidumping (AD) laws provide a remedy against the controversial trade 
practice known as dumping. Dumping refers to the act of selling goods in a 
foreign market at prices below their normal value.  Normal value is the term 
of art describing the “fair price” of a good.  The concept of normal is always 
controversial, but the rationale behind antidumping laws is that a government 
may offset the effect of dumping by imposing an antidumping duty when the 
“dumped” imports cause material injury to the domestic producers. 
In recent years, many scholars have raised concerns about the 
protectionist use of antidumping remedies and have called for reform.  
Among those scholars is Harvard Law Professor Mark Wu.  In his 2012 
article “Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants,” Professor Wu makes six 
proposals to reform World Trade Organization (WTO) law on antidumping.1  
One of his proposed ideas that he describes as “radical” is the requirement 
that all complaints for dumping be accompanied by proof of the underlying 
unfair trade practice that enables dumping.2  In support of his proposal, Wu 
correctly points out that existing WTO laws do not require petitioners to 
prove or explain the nature of the unfair trade practice that makes dumping 
possible.3  They only need to prove that the price of the dumped goods is 
below their “normal value.”4  This makes AD subject to abuse because there 
are various “methodological manipulations” available for calculating the 
normal value.5  Wu predicts that the proposed requirement for proof of the 
underlying unfair conditions would make it more difficult for a country to 
abuse AD to “punish” foreign producers engaging in price differentiation for 
strategic purposes.6  Although Wu may be right about the short-term 
potential effect of this reform proposal, I do not agree that his approach is the 
correct one to handle the problem of abusive AD.  
                                                                                                                   
 1 Those proposals consist of three “no regret” proposals and three “radical” proposals.  See 
Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 157–71 (2012). 
 2 Id. at 166.  Among the six proposals Wu makes, this Article focuses only on this 
particular proposal.  
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id.  
 6 Wu also suggests that this reform would have two additional benefits.  First, it would 
draw greater attention to the unfair trade practices that still exist in the world.  Second, 
governments would exercise greater restraint in using AD, because it would involve accusing 
its trade partners of engaging in unfair trade practices.  Such accusation might heighten 
political tension.  Id. at 166–67. 
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My analysis of his reform proposal focuses on the effect of AD rhetoric 
on the development of the lax legal standards in AD regulations that Wu 
identifies as the main reason for AD’s popularity as a protectionist remedy.7  
I argue that Wu’s reform proposal is problematic because (1) it affirms the 
existing rhetoric of AD, and (2) it introduces the unsettled concept of 
fairness into the WTO framework.  The existing rhetoric of AD is 
fundamentally flawed, and it only contributes to the establishment of the lax 
legal standards that make AD laws so susceptible to protectionist use.  
Introducing the concept of fairness does not solve this problem, because the 
concept is highly controversial.  Moreover, it emphasizes the punitive nature 
of dumping.  Denouncing the act of dumping only encourages abusive use of 
antidumping laws.  Therefore, Wu’s proposal does not address the 
fundamental cause of the problem which is the discrepancy between the 
rhetoric and the actual use of AD.  In this regard, I briefly discuss how the 
European Union (EU) addressed this problem of the discrepancy between the 
rhetoric of AD and its actual use.  After that, I propose a new rhetoric of AD 
that is more consistent with the measure’s actual use and explain how this 
new rhetoric can help reduce its abuse.  Finally, I briefly describe how the 
new rhetoric can be incorporated into WTO law and what impact this would 
be likely to have in the long run.  
II.  THE EXISTING RHETORIC OF AD 
Wu’s reform proposal is likely to have been influenced by the common 
notion that AD is, by definition, a response to unfair trade practices.  
According to Jackson, “the distinction between responses to ‘fair trade’ and 
those to ‘unfair trade’ has long been understood.”8  Jackson states that the 
distinction is drawn between escape mechanisms, such as safeguards, and 
trade remedies, such as AD and countervailing duties (CVD).  The former 
may be exercised regardless of the existence of any actionable unfair trade 
practice, while the latter are designed “to offset the effects of the ‘unfair’ 
actions, and perhaps to go further and have a sort of ‘punitive’ effect, to 
inhibit such actions in the future.”9  
                                                                                                                   
 7 Id. at 107–13.  
 8 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 247 (2d ed. 1997) (emphasis added). 
 9 Id.  
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In the United States, supporters of AD argue that it ensures fair trade by 
offsetting market distortions caused by foreign governments.10  Therefore, 
today’s AD is viewed, even by its supporters, as remedial rather than 
punitive.  However, the notion that dumping is a condemnable act remains 
strong.  Clear evidence of this notion is found in Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), which states that contracting 
parties recognize that injurious dumping is “to be condemned.”11  Such 
strong language is not found, for example, in the provisions dealing with 
CVDs or safeguards.12  In fact, this is the only time the word condemn is 
used in the entire GATT 1947 agreement.13  Therefore, one can easily infer 
that AD is founded on the rhetoric that dumping should be condemned as an 
unfair trade practice.  
The notion that dumping is a condemnable act is a century old.14  When 
Canada adopted the world’s first AD law in 1904, then-Canadian minister of 
finance, the Honorable W.S. Fielding, described dumping as a method of 
trade adopted by the producers in high-tariff countries to “obtain command 
of a neighboring market” by “put[ting] aside all reasonable consideration 
with regard to the cost or fair price of the goods.”15  He then proposed to 
address this “evil” through the use of AD duties.16 
In the United States, AD law developed as an extension of antitrust law.17  
Hence, the notion that AD is a remedy against the “evils of monopoly 
power” was even stronger in the United States than in Canada.18  Although 
AD later developed into a body of law distinct from antitrust laws, its 
rhetoric remained more or less the same—i.e., “finding and punishing 
foreign unfairness.”19  It is therefore conceivable that similar rhetoric was 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Brink Lindsey, The U.S. Antidumping Law Rhetoric Versus Reality, TRADE & POL’Y 
ANALYSIS, Aug. 1999, at 2, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tpa-
007.pdf.  
 11 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT 1947]. 
 12 Id. arts. VI, XIX.  
 13 See generally id. 
 14 JACKSON, supra note 8, at 251. 
 15 Michael J. Finger, The Origins and Evolution of AD Regulation 3–4 (Country Econ. 
Dep’t of the World Bank, Pol’y  Res. Working Paper Series 783, 1991). 
 16 Id. at 4. 
 17 Id. at 11. 
 18 Id. According to Finger, in the United States, “policing the evils of monopoly power” 
was not only the rhetoric of AD but also the mechanics of it, because the “early U.S. 
antidumping regulations were, in substance, extensions of antitrust law.” 
 19 Id. at 17.  
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used when the United States put the subject of AD on the table for inclusion 
in the GATT 1947.20  According to Finger, “[t]he United States provided the 
basic working document for the international trade organization negotiations, 
and this suggested charter contained most of the provisions on AD that are 
now in GATT Article VI.”21  Therefore, it is no coincidence that Article VI 
reflects the century-old rhetoric that dumping should be condemned.  
However, this rhetoric is flawed because it does not reflect how AD is used 
in practice. 
III.  THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE RHETORIC OF AD AND ITS ACTUAL 
USE 
A.  Historical Use of AD  
According to Finger, there is not much historical evidence to suggest that 
“antidumping ever had a scope more particular than protecting home 
producers from import competition.”22  He says that although the Canadian 
government succeeded in passing the world’s first AD law using the rhetoric 
that dumping is unfair, the rhetoric did not reflect the true intention of the 
Canadian government, which was protectionism.23  In this regard, AD was a 
brilliant invention, because unlike tariffs it allowed the Canadian government 
to retain some selectivity over the provision of protection.24  Finger argues 
that the protectionist intent of the Canadian government was evident in the 
standard of proof contained in the first Canadian AD law, which states that  
[w]henever it appears to the satisfaction of the minister of 
customs . . . that . . . the actual selling price [of an article] to the 
importer in Canada . . . is less than the fair market 
value . . . such article[ ] shall . . .  be subject to a special duty of 
customs equal to the difference between such fair market value 
and such selling price.25 
                                                                                                                   
 20 It must be noted, however, that neither Article VI of the GATT 1947 nor the U.S. law on 
AD (except for the 1916 Antidumping Act) is concerned with the intent of the dumping party.  
This raises the question of genuineness regarding the rhetoric of AD.  
 21 See Finger, supra note 15, at 24–25. 
 22 Id. at 1. 
 23 Id. at 14–15. 
 24 Id. at 3–11. 
 25 Id. at 4. 
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This standard is almost identical to the standard used in today’s AD laws26 
and reflects virtually no concern for the unfairness of the price discrimination 
at issue.  
The situation was slightly different in the United States.  The early U.S. 
AD laws captured the spirit of the proposed rhetoric better than the Canadian 
law.  For example, the Antidumping Act of 1916, until it was repealed in 
2004,27 provided for both civil and criminal liabilities for importing foreign 
goods into the U.S. market at a price substantially below the “actual market 
value” with the “intent to injure, destroy, or prevent the establishment of an 
industry in the United States or to restrain competition.”28  However, the 
1916 act was never popular, mainly due to “the onerous predatory intent 
requirement,”29 which was consequently dropped in the 1921 act.30  
According to Finger, a series of changes in the standard of proof 
eventually transformed the AD laws around the world into a tool of 
protectionism.31  He asserts that the most straightforward expression of the 
newly emerged “soft” standard is the “best information available” clause 
now found in Article 6.8 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (ADA).32  Article 6.8 
states that “[i]n cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or 
otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period 
or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final 
determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the 
facts available.”33  Finger argues that this clause represents a shift from a 
                                                                                                                   
 26 Article VI:1 of the GATT 1947 defines dumping as introducing products of one country 
into the commerce of another country at less than the “normal value” of the products.  Article 
VI:1(a) provides a presumption of dumping “if the price of the product exported from one 
country to another . . . is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the 
like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.”  GATT 1947, supra 
note 11, art VI:1.  
 27 See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS136 United States – AD Act of 1916, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (Nov. 11, 2012, 2:34 PM), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dis_ /cases_/d 
s 136_e.htm 
 28 See Finger, supra note 15, at 12–23; see also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, 
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 260 (3d ed. 2005). 
 29 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 28, at 245. 
 30 See Finger, supra note 15, at 18. 
 31 Id. at 20–22. 
 32 Id. at 21.  Finger cites a provision of the GATT antidumping code which is now found in 
Article 6.8 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.  See Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 6.8, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 
U.N.T.S. [hereinafter ADA]. 
 33 See ADA art. 6.8, supra note 32.  
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legal to an administrative standard that allowed the administrators of the AD 
laws to quickly follow the “changing political pressures for protectionism.”34  
B.  Recent Use of AD 
In the 1980s, AD law began to emerge as the “weapon of choice” for 
protectionism by major developed countries.35  For example, in 1980, the 
United States issued eighty-four antidumping orders.36  This number 
increased to 197 by 1990.37  During this period, AD was also used heavily by 
other Western countries.  Between 1980 and 1990, the four trading powers 
that are now known as the “traditional users” of AD, the U.S., Canada, 
Australia, and the EU, were responsible for bringing 95% of all AD cases 
worldwide.38  According to Bhala, AD had become a “potent weapon for 
protectionists” in those countries.39  
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations did not change the situation.  
Although the Uruguay Round imposed significant restrictions on the use of 
nontariff instruments, AD and other contingent forms of protectionism 
survived.40  The adoption of the ADA raised hope for keeping AD under 
control, but the ADA was grossly insufficient to prevent protectionists from 
using AD as a nontariff barrier to trade.41  According to Wu, the four 
traditional users enshrined their “quasi-protectionist” legal standard into the 
ADA to ensure that they could continue to use AD to protect their 
industries.42  Despite the adoption of the ADA, AD has been by far the most 
popular trade remedy among the various forms of contingent protection 
available under the WTO framework.43  Between 1995 and 2012, there were 
4,230 AD initiations reported to the WTO Committee on Antidumping.44  
                                                                                                                   
 34 Finger, supra note 15, at 21.  It must be noted however that Annex II of the ADA 
provides some procedural protections against the abusive use of the administrative power set 
out under Article 6.8 of the ADA.  
 35 Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 3, 3–4 
(1995).  
 36 Id. at 3.  
 37 Id. at 4.  
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Wu, supra note 1, at 107. 
 41 See Bhala, supra note 35, at 5. 
 42 Wu, supra note 1, at 109. 
 43 Id. at 107–08. 
 44 See WTO Statistics on Antidumping, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
adp_e/adp_e.htm [hereinafter AD Statistics]. 
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During the same period, 2,719 AD measures were imposed.45  According to 
Wu’s calculations, AD duties accounted for more than 90% of legal 
contingent protection measures enacted worldwide in the last five years.46 
Interestingly, AD is no longer used exclusively by the Western powers.  
“Between 1985 and 2000, over fifty new countries . . . adopted antidumping 
laws.”47  Currently, more than forty WTO members, including many 
developing countries, use AD actions consistently.48  India, for example, has 
was the leading initiator of AD proceedings every year from 2005 to 2012 in 
terms of the number of cases filed.49  Other “top users” of AD actions 
include China, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and Turkey.50  This does not 
mean that the traditional users have curtailed their use of AD.  Those 
countries are still the leading users of AD in terms of trade size, because their 
markets are considerably larger than are those of the developing countries.51  
In other words, the use of AD has become a truly global phenomenon.  
The worldwide proliferation of AD laws and the increasing popularity of 
AD actions in recent years have alarmed many economists and legal 
scholars.52  The clear consensus among the scholars is that AD is not used in 
accordance with its original rhetoric, which is remedying unfair trade 
practices.53  Instead, many countries are simply using AD laws to protect 
their domestic industries.  For example, one study suggests that at most 2% 
of the EU’s antidumping cases were targeted to address predatory pricing.54  
Therefore, there is a clear discrepancy between the original rhetoric of AD 
laws and their actual use.  
IV.  THE REASON FOR THE DISCREPANCY: LAX LEGAL STANDARDS 
As Wu identifies, the lax legal standards embedded in the ADA are the 
primary source of the discrepancy between the rhetoric of AD and its actual 
                                                                                                                   
 45 Id. 
 46 Wu, supra note 1, at 103. 
 47 Id. at 117. 
 48 See MICHAEL TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 333 (4th 
ed. 2013).  
 49 See AD Statistics, supra note 44.  India and the EU tied for first in 2006.  
 50 See id.  
 51 Id. 
 52 See Wentong Zheng, Reforming Trade Remedies, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 151, 155–57 (2012). 
 53 Id. at 156. 
 54 Wu, supra note 1, at 110. 
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use.55  These lax legal standards affect both the determination of dumping 
and the injury required under the ADA for the imposition of an AD duty.56 
A.  Dumping Determination 
Article 2.1 of the ADA defines dumping as introducing a product “into 
the commerce of another country at less than its normal value” and provides 
for a presumption of dumping when the export price of a good is below “the 
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product . . . in 
the exporting country.”57  This standard is heavily criticized for having no 
economic rationale.  Many scholars argue that the only economic rationale 
for AD is to combat predatory pricing.58  However, price differentiation does 
not necessarily mean predatory pricing.  For example, under U.S. antitrust 
law most courts have ruled that only prices below the seller’s average 
variable costs (AVCs) are predatory.59  These decisions have some economic 
rationale because AVCs represent the minimum price at which firms can sell 
their goods without incurring short-term losses.60  Therefore, firms would not 
sell their products below their AVCs unless they had some ulterior 
motives—i.e., predatory ones.  Article 2.1 clearly sets a different standard.  
The price of a good in “the ordinary course of trade” usually represents the 
seller’s average total costs (ATCs) plus some profit.  A firm may decide to 
lower the price of its goods in a foreign market because it has not yet 
established a good reputation in that market or because the economic 
environment in that market is different from that in the home market.61  Such 
decisions may be perfectly rational to the extent that the foreign price is 
above the seller’s AVCs because such a price would not cause any short-
term loss.  Therefore, inferring predatory intent in those circumstances is 
problematic.  However, the ADA does not even have a requirement for a 
particular intent to impose AD duties.62  
                                                                                                                   
 55 See id. at 108. 
 56 Id. at 109. 
 57 See ADA, supra note 32, art. 2.1 (emphasis added). 
 58 See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 28, at 260; see also Zheng, supra note 52, at 160–
63.  
 59 See generally Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related 
Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). 
 60 See ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 161 (2013). 
 61 See Wu, supra note 1, at 111. 
 62 See generally ADA, supra note 32. 
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The standard set out in Article 2.1 does not help determine the intent of 
the seller engaging in dumping or describe the effect of dumping.  Although 
Article 3 provides that only injurious dumping should be remedied,63 the act 
described as dumping in Article 2.1 does not necessarily result in injury to 
the domestic industry in the importing country.  This is because the fair value 
of a good, or its price in the ordinary course of trade in the home country, 
does not provide any information about the competitive environment in the 
foreign market.  In other words, whether a seller sells its products in a 
foreign market at a price below or above its home price is not indicative of 
whether the producers in that foreign market can compete with the seller.  
The only economic significance of the home market price in the ordinary 
course of trade is that it may be indicative of the comparative advantage of 
the home country in producing the good.  Therefore, the only reasonable 
interpretation of the Article 2.1 definition of dumping would be that 
“dumping” is the act of selling a good below the price that is indicative of the 
comparative advantage of the exporting country.  In other words, the 
standard set out in Article 2.1 stipulates that the members of the WTO can 
impose an AD duty on a good that is priced to be more competitive than is 
indicative of the comparative advantage of the exporting because the 
members had agreed to liberalize their trades only to the extent necessary to 
enjoy the benefits of the comparative advantages of each other and no more.  
However, in order for this interpretation to be valid, the following conditions 
must be met: (1) the market in the home country must be a perfect one and 
(2) the price of a good always represents the long-run market equilibrium.  
The producers in a perfect market cannot make any profit in the long run 
because there is no entry barrier.64  Competitors enter the market as long as 
there is a potential for profits, and the increased competition lowers the price 
until all profits are completely depleted.65  Hence, the long-run price in a 
perfect market represents the true comparative advantage of the producers in 
that market, which is their ATCs.  However, most economists would agree 
that such a perfect market rarely exists in practice and that the price of a 
good often does not represent the long-run equilibrium.  Therefore, the price 
in the ordinary course of trade in exporting country does not necessarily 
indicate of the comparative advantage of that country in producing the good.  
Hence, there is no economic rationale behind the Article 2.1 standard. 
                                                                                                                   
 63 Id. art. 3.5.  
 64 See FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 60, at 186, 187. 
 65 Id. 
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In addition to the unsoundness of Article 2.1 standard, the various 
alternative methods of calculating the “normal value” permitted under 
Article 2.2 are also problematic.  Under this article, there are three 
circumstances in which countries are allowed to use alternative methods: 
(1) where the goods are not sold in the course of business in the home 
market; (2) where less than 5% of the goods are sold in the home market; and 
(3) where “the particular market situation” in the home market does not 
allow a “proper comparison.”66  Under these circumstances, countries are 
allowed to calculate the normal value: (a) based on the price of the good in a 
third country; (b) using “the cost of production” in the home county “plus a 
reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for 
profits”; or (c) “using [the] factor costs in surrogate countries” if the good is 
from a country with a non-market economy.67  According to Wu, these 
exceptions and alternatives allow the administrators of AD to manipulate the 
numbers so that the normal value is “sufficiently inflated” to support a 
finding of dumping.68  Therefore, the lax legal standards allow countries to 
use AD as a protectionist tool.  
B.  Injury Determination 
The laxness is also evident in injury determination.  Article VI(1) of 
GATT 1947 provides that dumping “is to be condemned if it causes or 
threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a 
contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic 
industry.”69  Article 3 of the ADA states that determination of injury must be 
based on “positive evidence” and involve an objective evaluation of “all 
relevant economic factors.”70  However, the ADA does not require actual 
proof of economic injury.  Instead, the administrators of AD can presume 
injury if certain price and volume requirements are met.  Under Article 3.2, 
the following questions are relevant in determining the effect of dumping on 
the price of a good: (1) “whether there has been a significant price 
undercutting by the dumped imports” and (2) “whether the effect of such 
imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price 
                                                                                                                   
 66 ADA, supra note 32, art. 2.2. 
 67 Id.; Wu, supra note 1, at 112.  
 68 Wu, supra note 1, at 112. 
 69 GATT 1947, supra note 11, art. VI(1) (emphasis added). 
 70 ADA, supra note 32, art. 3.  
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increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.”71  
This is an incredibly vague standard.  
The volume requirement is not too onerous either.  The only requirement 
is that at least 3% of the total imports of the good must come from the 
country that is subject to the AD investigation.72  This requirement is so low 
it is easily satisfied.73  
Article 3.5 provides that there must be a causal relationship between 
dumping and injury, but it does not provide any clear standard.74  The 
determination of causality only needs to be “based on an examination of all 
relevant evidence.”75  Such evidence may include declining factory 
utilization, increasing inventories, or other signs of financial hardship 
coinciding with an increase of cheaper foreign imports.  Therefore, under the 
vague requirement, governments can easily prove causality based on 
concurrence of events.76  These provisions again give wide discretion to 
administrators of AD, allowing them to use AD for protectionist purposes.   
V.  THE REASON FOR THE LAX LEGAL STANDARDS: THE RHETORIC OF AD  
The lax legal standards found in the ADA are attributable to the rhetoric 
of AD.  As Wu points out, the lax legal standards have been enshrined in the 
ADA by traditional users of AD that support their positions with the very 
same rhetoric they used to adopt their domestic AD laws.77  Therefore, the 
fact that the ADA has legal standards that make AD susceptible to 
protectionist use is not a coincidence.  There are two ways the rhetoric 
supports the lax legal standards: (1) it attaches a negative connotation to the 
word dumping and (2) it incorporates the concept of fairness, which is 
extremely vague. 
                                                                                                                   
 71 Id. art. 3.2. 
 72 Id. art. 5.8. 
 73 Wu, supra note 1, at 113. 
 74 ADA, supra note 32, art. 3.5. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Wu, supra note 1, at 113. 
 77 See id. at 109. 
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A.  Is AD Punitive or Remedial? 
There is no doubt that AD is now a remedial measure, not a punitive 
one.78  The Antidumping Act of 1916 provided for both civil and criminal 
liabilities for dumping provided that there was a predatory intent, but the act 
was rarely used.79  Every once in a while, an argument is made in the U.S. 
Congress that a law should be enacted to establish a private right of action 
against dumping, but it rarely gets anywhere.80  
However, the rhetoric of AD still attaches a negative connotation to the 
word dumping by defining it as an unfair trade practice.  This derogatory 
element then allows the proponents of AD to stand on the “rhetorical high 
ground” during a policy debate and to argue as if countries have some 
inherent rights in AD.81  According to Zheng, this “democracy deficit” 
prevents “the real questions about trade protectionism from being scrutinized 
and debated in a meaningful manner.”82  
Therefore, while the actual AD regulations are remedial, the rhetoric 
behind the regulations may be punitive.  This is critical because the fact that 
the regulations are remedial allows adoption of the administrative standard of 
proof instead of the rule-of-law standard.  This administrative standard of 
proof then permits various methodological manipulations by the 
administrators.  At the same time, the rhetoric focusing on the punitive 
nature of dumping supports low barriers to proving the manipulated AD.  
B.  What is Fair?  
Another way the rhetoric has contributed to the establishment of lax legal 
standards is that, although the rhetoric condemns dumping as an unfair trade 
practice, there is no consensus on the definition of unfairness in international 
trade.  In other words, the adoption of lax legal standards was inevitable 
because no one was absolutely certain how unfair dumping should be 
defined. 
                                                                                                                   
 78 See Lindsey, supra note 10, at 1 (suggesting that the practice of AD is more punitive than 
the rhetoric implies).  
 79 See Finger, supra note 15, at 12–13.  
 80 See Roger P. Alford, Why a Private Right of Action Against Dumping Would Violate 
GATT, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 696, 698–700 (1991). 
 81 Zheng, supra note 52, at 180. 
 82 Id.  
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To illustrate the diversity of the current theories of fairness in 
international trade and how difficult it would be to achieve a consensus 
among them, some of the best-known ones are introduced below.  
1.  Unfair Competition 
One of the early arguments adopted by the proponents of AD was that 
price discrimination in international trade is per se an “unfair competition.”83  
Barceló explains that this concept had its origin in tort law, in which 
plaintiffs used the concept “to obtain relief against various deceptive and 
unscrupulous business practices such as plagiarism, theft of trade secrets, 
fake or deceptively imitative labeling, or disparagement of another enterprise 
or product.”84  However, Barceló also points out that there is no policy 
justification for outlawing all instances of price discrimination.85  Moreover, 
he opines that such a concept, if applied in international trade, “would grant 
domestic [producers] a commercial property right in [regard to] existing 
customers or price levels” that would “wholly swallow” the doctrine of 
liberal trade.86  Even though this doctrine, if applicable, would provide the 
greatest coverage for AD, it does not seem to be popular today.  
2. Market Efficiency 
Another concept of fairness is based on the theory of market efficiency.  
The neo-liberalist argument for government intervention to prohibit 
monopolies and “other anti-competitive situations” has long been accepted.87  
This approach suggests that anti-competitive behaviors should be condemned 
as unfair practices because they raise prices, stifle innovation, and generally 
distort market efficiency.88  This theory presents the soundest basis for 
antitrust law.   
The early rhetoric of AD law was not much different from that of antitrust 
law.  In both Canada and the United States, the rhetoric was based on 
                                                                                                                   
 83 John J. Barceló III, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade—the United States and the 
International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 496, 502 (1972).  Jackson opined that 
the notion that sales at different prices to different persons are somehow unfair might be “a 
leftover from medieval notions of ‘fair price.’ ” JACKSON, supra note 8, at 253. 
 84 Barceló, supra note 83, at 502. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. 
 87 See GREG MASTEL, ANTIDUMPING LAWS AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 65 (1998). 
 88 Id.  
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fighting against the evils of foreign trusts.89  The only difference was that AD 
law addressed predatory pricing at the international level, whereas antitrust 
law was concerned with domestic predatory pricing.90  However, the gap 
between the rhetoric and actual AD regulations is enormous.  In Canada, the 
gap was already wide when the country adopted its first AD law in 1904.91  
The adopted law contrasted sharply with the rhetoric in terms of standards of 
proof that shifted the focus of the law from condemning monopolies to 
limiting imports.92  The gap was much narrower in the United States when it 
adopted its first AD law in 1916.93  However, because the adopted law failed 
to meet the hopes of its protectionist supporters, a series of changes occurred 
to make it a tool for ordinary protection.94  The wide gap between the early 
rhetoric of AD and what the actual regulations bar is today means that the 
concept of fairness based on the traditional neo-liberalist model no longer 
provides strong support for AD.  Trebilcock and Howse argue that predatory 
pricing is the only economic justification for AD, but “AD laws are ill-
designed to identify and penalize true international predatory pricing.”95  
Dumping and AD were considered from different angles when strategic 
trade theory emerged in the 1980s.96  As economists started to recognize the 
role of governments in promoting national welfare by creating conditions of 
imperfect competition through mechanisms such as tariffs, subsidies, 
dumping, and other related market distortions, they also started to recognize 
the role of AD as a relief against the detrimental effects of dumping.97  
Therefore, the economic justification for AD today includes the concept of 
fairness based on the notion of market efficiency supported by the traditional 
neo-liberalist argument against monopolies and the strategic trade theory that 
dumping is a strategic market distortion.98  
                                                                                                                   
 89 See generally Finger, supra note 15. 
 90 See MASTEL, supra note 87, at 65.  
 91 See Finger, supra note 15, at 16. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 17.  
 95 See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 28, at 260. 
 96 See MASTEL, supra note 87, at 65; see also PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 275–96 (5th ed. 2000). 
 97 MASTEL, supra note 87, at 72–74. 
 98 Id. at 65. 
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3.  Reciprocity 
Yet another concept of fairness in international trade is the notion of 
“reciprocity.”99  Two aspects of this theory are worth noting.  First, 
according to Bhagwati, lack of reciprocity does not necessarily mean an 
adverse impact on national welfare.100  However, he states that policy 
questions are rarely decided without reference to “the role of emotions.”101  
Therefore, “lack of reciprocity in free trade is generally considered, 
regardless of its impact on national welfare, as simply unfair.”102  Second, 
there is a more rational basis for reciprocity as grounds for fairness.  Because 
the most efficient allocation of resources can be achieved when all countries 
adhere to free trade, a departure by one country must be condemned.103  
Moreover, a rule-based system such as the GATT requires symmetric or 
uniform rights and obligations on all of its members.104  
4. Level Playing Field 
Closely related to the concept of fairness based on reciprocity is the idea 
of the “level playing field.”105  According to Jackson, this concept “evokes 
the notion of economic activity as a game, and the idea that competition in 
this game should be defined according to a set of rules that all participants 
share.”106  The underlying logic is that the level playing field achieves 
                                                                                                                   
 99 See generally Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Fair Trade, Reciprocity, and Harmonization: The 
Novel Challenge to the Theory and Policy of Free Trade, in PROTECTIONISM AND WORLD 
WELFARE 17 (Dominick Salvatore ed., 1993). 
 100 Id. at 24. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id.  
 103 Id.  
 104 Id. 
 105 Some versions of the level-playing-field theory are incredibly similar to the concept of 
fairness based on reciprocity.  For example, Lindsey and Ikenson explain level-playing-field 
theory as an argument that “international competition should be subject to certain agreed-upon 
‘rules of the game’ according to which some sources of competitive advantage—trade 
barriers, subsidies, and other market-distorting government policies—are condemned as 
unfair.”  See, e.g., BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED: THE 
DEVILISH DETAILS OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW 18 (2003).  Notice that the version of level-playing-
field theory I introduce here does not presume that there is a set of agreed-upon rules that 
decide which sources of competitive advantage are unfair.  It only presumes that all parties 
have agreed to compete under the same set of rules so that no one has any unfair advantage 
over others.     
 106 JACKSON, supra note 8, at 248. 
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fairness among the participants by ensuring each participant has an equal 
chance to succeed.  
This approach, although similar to fairness based on reciprocity, yields to 
a broader definition of unfair activity, because while reciprocity deals with 
only those policies that are mutually agreed upon by the contracting states, 
the level-playing-field approach deals with all policies that are different 
among countries.  Therefore, in the international trade setting, the concept of 
a level playing field can provide a basis for numerous unfair-advantage 
claims.  Almost any policy in the exporting country that deals with issues 
such as the environment, labor relations, or tax can be interpreted as giving 
unfair advantages to producers in the importing country if the policies in the 
two countries differ.107  The home country then might demand harmonization 
of such policies or imposition of corrective measures, such as AD or CVD.108  
The problem is that the overreaching nature of the level-playing-field 
argument enables a variety of protectionist interventions that are a threat not 
only to the doctrine of free trade but also to the principle of national 
sovereignty.109  According to Bhagwati, the demands for fair trade in this 
sense “have grown out of hand.”110   
This brief survey of the different schools of thought concerning fairness 
in international trade illustrates how diverse they are.  Some have evolved in 
the legal discipline, while others have evolved in other fields of social 
science such as economics and sociology.  Some are interdisciplinary.  These 
schools often differ wildly in their foci, in that the concept of fairness is often 
analyzed in relation to important but variant values such as justice, individual 
rights, efficiency, reciprocity, and equality.  The extreme diversity in the 
approaches taken to explain what fairness is in international trade means that 
a consensus on the definition of fairness is unlikely to emerge any time soon.  
As Jackson notes, this fundamental disagreement about what should be 
                                                                                                                   
 107 Bhagwati, supra note 99, at 38. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Jackson points out that the problem of level-playing-field theory arises because “societies 
and their economic systems differ so dramatically that what seems ‘unfair’ to members of one 
society may seem perfectly fair to those of another society.”  JACKSON, supra note 8, at 248.  
However, I do not agree with this point because, under the level-field-theory, unfairness arises 
out of the difference between the policies, not whether one society’s policy is perceived to be 
fair by another society.  The demands for harmonization or imposition of corrective measures 
are made to eliminate the difference, not to correct the “unfairness” of the policy at issue.  
Those demands are a threat to the national sovereignty of the country to which the demands 
are made, regardless of that policy’s perceived fairness by either party.  
 110 Bhagwati, supra note 99, at 39.  
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called “unfair” is why “the distinction between fair and unfair trade has 
become increasingly blurred” today.111  Therefore, the rhetoric based on 
fairness cannot provide an adequate guideline for the policy to be adopted.   
VI.  DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DEAL WITH THE DISCREPANCY 
There are several ways to deal with the discrepancy between the rhetoric 
of AD and its actual use.  One of them is Wu’s reform proposal.  Another 
interesting approach worth discussing is the “Community interest” 
requirement under the AD laws of the EU.  Lastly, I propose that a new 
rhetoric of AD could address the discrepancy issue.  
A.  Wu’s Reform Proposal 
Wu proposes to make two changes to WTO laws:  
First, Article 5.2 of the ADA should be amended to require that 
petitioners, when filing an antidumping case, must provide 
evidence of unfair practice(s) that enable the defendant to 
engage in dumping.  Second, Article 12.2 of the ADA should 
be amended to require that government authorities, in their 
rulings, explain which of the unfair trade practices alleged by 
the petitioner were found to exist and how those practices 
enabled dumping.112  
Wu claims that these changes would make abusive use of AD difficult, 
and that countries would no longer be able to impose AD duties for purely 
protectionist purposes.113  He also claims that his proposal would ensure that 
AD remains a sanction in situations in which “unfair trade practices actually 
exist.”114  He then suggests that such a situation exists when a foreign 
country is enjoying a sanctuary home market for any number of reasons, 
such as “(a) the government’s unwillingness to enforce competition laws; (b) 
excessively high tariff rates for the product, as compared to other WTO 
members’ rates; (c) non-tariff barriers to entry; (d) the government’s implicit 
guarantee against continuing losses; and (e) market-distorting industrial 
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policy.”115  In other words, these are some of the unfair practices that Wu 
provides as examples of the practices that give rise to application of AD 
duties.  It is not clear which concept of fairness he uses to devise this list, but 
all the items seem to qualify as unfair practices under the concept of fairness 
based on either reciprocity or the level playing field.  
Wu seems to suggest that the unfairness of dumping derives from the 
unfairness of the underlying conditions that make such dumping possible.  If 
he is not suggesting this, then he may be proposing that an imposition of AD 
duty should only be dependent on the unfairness of the underlying 
conditions, not on the unfairness of dumping itself.  If the position Wu takes 
is the former, then one must examine whether the correlation between the 
unfairness of dumping and the unfairness of the underlying factors enabling 
dumping is a perfect one.  For example, some predatory pricing practices 
considered dumping by many scholars and practitioners may be unassociated 
with any underlying factors that are unfair.116  Furthermore, there can be 
situations in which a foreign producer engages in price discrimination strictly 
for strategic purposes and, therefore, such a practice should not be 
considered dumping, though there may happen to be underlying unfair 
conditions that contribute to that producer’s ability to engage in such pricing.  
If the position taken by Wu is the latter, it is unclear why he is only 
concerned with the unfairness of the underlying conditions.  Maybe he is 
trying to avoid affirming the traditional rhetoric of AD because its flaws are 
evident, or he is also trying to make the point that AD is rarely used today to 
address the unfairness of dumping.  Alternatively, perhaps he is trying to 
bring the current AD laws into conformity with some particular type of 
rhetoric he finds reasonable.  It is also plausible that his approach is purely 
pragmatic, and he simply does not care about the rhetoric of AD.  In any 
event, whether he is focusing on the fairness of AD or the fairness of the 
underlying trade practices, his proposal is subject to the following criticisms.  
1.  Criticisms  
I find Wu’s reform proposal problematic because: (1) it affirms the old 
rhetoric of AD as a remedy against unfair trade practices and (2) it suggests 
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 116 For example, sellers without established market base or reputation in a foreign market 
may decide to sell their goods below the market cost, to “induce consumers to sample their 
goods for the first time, as a marketing strategy.”  In this situation, there would be no 
circumstances that are particularly unfair.  TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 48, at 357. 
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that the concept of fairness should formally be introduced to and 
incorporated into WTO law.117  
  a.  Affirmation of the Existing Rhetoric 
Rhetoric is important because it reflects the objective of proposed policies 
and provides a clear guideline for the form and structure of the regulations to 
be adopted.  Therefore, the success of a policy depends on its rhetoric.  
However, the current rhetoric of AD is problematic because (1) it does not 
properly reflect the true intent of policymakers or the actual use of AD and 
(2) its focus on the unfair nature of dumping allows for the adoption of the 
lax legal standards that make AD susceptible to manipulation.  
   i.  Rhetoric vs. Reality 
Even in its very early days, the rhetoric of AD never really reflected the 
true intentions of the policymakers.  In many countries, AD laws were born 
out of the necessity of dealing with the protectionist political pressure from 
particular industries or producers.118  AD laws, combined with flexible rules 
for custom valuation, simply provided a unique form of protectionism that 
could be applied selectively.119  The notion that dumping was an unfair trade 
practice that needed to be condemned was nothing more than an attractive 
slogan adopted by protectionists.  Therefore, it is futile to attempt to bring 
today’s AD laws in conformity with their original rhetoric.  
Even today, there is little evidence that national governments are using 
AD to combat unfair trade practices abroad or that they even desire to use 
AD for such purposes.  In fact, the widespread abuse of AD as an ordinary 
protectionist mechanism better reflects the true expectation of most national 
governments.  This means that any reform proposal to curtail the 
effectiveness of AD as a protectionist tool is likely to be forcefully resisted 
by national governments.  Wu must understand this point well because he 
                                                                                                                   
 117 Note that although GATT 1947 uses the expression “to be condemned,” it does not 
explicitly define dumping as an unfair trade practice.  The Anti-Dumping Agreement also 
does not refer to dumping as an unfair trade practice, and there is no test for determining the 
unfairness of an activity.  See generally GATT 1947, supra note 11; ADA, supra note 32; see 
also K.D. RAJU, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON ANTI-DUMPING: A 
GATT/WTO AND INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE 8 (2008).  
 118 See Finger, supra note 15, at 2–8. 
 119 Id. at 4–7. 
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describes his proposal as “radical.”120  However, he seems to think that this 
resistance can be overcome.  
Wu argues that the U.S. and EU should consider reforming AD laws 
because although the existing global AD regime still benefits the traditional 
users (i.e., they are still the “top” users in terms of trade size); “the balance 
of benefits” will soon flip as the developing countries start to explore the full 
potential of the protectionist uses of AD.121  According to Wu, now is the 
time for reform because developing countries such as China and India still 
appear willing to raise the bar for the use of AD, considering “the immense 
scale of [AD] sanctions levied against their exporters and their internal 
political economy.”122  In other words, the developing countries may still 
“trade long-term advantage for concrete near-term gains.”123  
Wu might be right that now it is in the interest of both traditional and new 
users of AD to make radical reforms that ultimately eliminate the current 
uses of AD.  However, if that is true, would it not be better to simply 
eliminate AD laws altogether?  AD laws have been the subject of heavy 
criticism for decades, and many scholars argue that these laws should be 
replaced by mechanisms such as harmonized antitrust laws or should simply 
be repealed.124  If we are given the opportunity to eliminate AD, why would 
we want to create another mechanism that inherits the name “antidumping” 
but does something else, considering the possibility that the new mechanism 
might become just as problematic as its predecessor has?  This concern is 
justified because the new AD regime employs the same rhetoric based on the 
controversial notion of fairness that led to the adoption of lax legal standards. 
   ii.  Punitive vs. Remedial 
The current AD regime is susceptible to abuse because its rhetoric 
focuses on the unfairness of dumping.  The notion that AD is a “good thing” 
because it condemns the unfairness of dumping allowed the adoption of lax 
legal standards that made AD susceptible to manipulation.  If the rhetoric of 
AD did not focus so much on the punitive nature of dumping, today’s AD 
                                                                                                                   
 120 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 121 Wu, supra note 1, at 124–28. 
 122 Id. at 165. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Trebilcock and Howse advocate for replacement of AD with harmonized antitrust laws.  
TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 28, at 260.  McGee argues that AD laws should simply be 
repealed.  Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 491 (1993).  
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regime might be equipped with more abuse-conscious regulations such as 
those dealing with the requirement for compensation and maximum periods.  
In this regard, the traditional rhetoric is inconsistent with the other two 
“radical” reform proposals offered by Wu: (a) making it more difficult to 
extend AD duties and (b) requiring compensation for sustained AD duties.125  
Wu suggests that there are three ways to make the extension of AD more 
difficult.  First, Article 11 of the ADA can be amended to require that the AD 
duty be removed upon proof that the unfair trade practice that justified it has 
ceased to exist.126  Second, WTO law can be amended to require that the 
sunset reviews are subject to the same procedures and methodologies as is 
the initial AD investigation.127  Third, AD duties can be made subject to only 
a limited number of extensions.128  Although the first two ways do not clash 
with the traditional rhetoric of AD, the last one does.  As long as AD is based 
on the grounds that dumping is unfair, there is no justification to limit its use 
simply because it is overused.  In other words, abusive use provides grounds 
for restraint but heavy use does not.  Wu claims that requiring explanation of 
the underlying unfair trade practices would prevent AD from being used 
abusively.129  If that is true, then there would be no justification for limiting 
the number of extensions as long as the underlying unfairness persists.  
A similar argument can be made about his proposal to require 
compensation for sustained AD duties.  In fact, he acknowledges that no 
compensation is justified for the application of AD duties to counter unfair 
practices because those duties represent a form of restitution for 
“problematic behavior, namely dumping.”130  However, he argues that 
compensation should be required to provide incentive to withdraw AD duties 
when the underlying unfair trade practices are terminated.131  It is 
questionable, though, that such incentive provides enough justification for 
requiring compensation while AD duties are levied to condemn unfair trade 
practices.  If so, almost anything that has a negative impact on the country 
that imposes AD duty can replace the requirement to pay compensation 
because it would also incentivize the country to remove the duty as soon as 
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possible.  Such a line of pragmatic thinking does not provide a coherent 
policy justification.  
Interestingly, Wu claims that his proposal requiring compensation would 
reduce the discrepancy between current international laws governing AD and 
those governing safeguards.132  He says that his proposal would shrink the 
gap between the two tools of contingent protection, which should be 
welcomed by the scholars who contend that safeguards should become the 
primary means of contingent protection.133  Ironically, while he proposes to 
make the mechanics of AD similar to those of safeguards, he proposes to 
affirm the difference in their rhetorics by engraving the concept of fairness 
into WTO law.  
  b.  Introduction of the Concept of Fairness into WTO Law 
Wu’s reform proposal is also problematic because it introduces a fairness 
test into the WTO regulations on AD.  As mentioned earlier, the definition of 
fairness is hardly settled.  Various theories and models have evolved under 
diverse intellectual frameworks.  Part of the reason AD has evolved into an 
instrument so susceptible to manipulation is that there is no consensus on 
what fairness is.  The vague definition of fairness gives a great deal of 
discretion to policymakers to experiment with AD laws.  For example, the 
concept of fairness developed under the neoclassical economic theories 
supports the application of AD against only predatory pricing, while the 
concept of fairness based on a level playing field provides justification for 
applying AD against virtually all types of price discrimination.134  Hence, the 
adoption of lax legal standards was only possible because of a lack of 
consensus on the definition of unfair dumping. 
Wu proposes to introduce the concept of fairness formally into WTO law 
by making amendments to the ADA.  This is a risky proposition, and it does 
not matter whether the application of the fairness test is required only for the 
underlying factors enabling dumping or for both the underlying factors and 
dumping itself.  The result will be fierce debates and disagreements. Such 
controversy will not only make the new AD regime susceptible to 
manipulation by national governments to meet their needs but will also 
create a new set of problems.  
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For example, if policymakers adopt a concept of fairness that is too 
narrow in scope, the newly adopted AD laws will not be effective in 
addressing the problems at issue.  On the other hand, if the concept of 
fairness adopted has too wide of a scope, the newly adopted AD regime will 
likely be considered a barrier to free trade.  
As Bhagwati states, the notion of fair trade, based either on reciprocity or 
on a level playing field, poses a great threat to trade liberalization.135  In this 
sense, Wu’s proposition is particularly dangerous because it deals with the 
fairness of the underlying factors rather than only the dumping itself.  Almost 
any country’s domestic policy can be interpreted as giving unfair competitive 
advantages to that country’s exporters and thus become a basis for imposing 
an AD duty.  
In addition, every dispute over the application of the new AD regime will 
be subject to arduous and unproductive debates over the question of the 
unfairness of the underlying conditions enabling the dumping.  In fact, the 
complexity of this process will likely resemble that of determining the 
countervailable subsidy for the application of CVD.  Therefore, even if the 
new regime reduces the number of complaints filed, the administrative costs 
might not be reduced significantly.  
Moreover, as the fundamental disagreement about the definition of 
fairness persists, any accusation of dumping and underlying unfair trade 
practices will likely create political tension.  Wu seems to anticipate this 
situation, but he only emphasizes its positive side by claiming that escalated 
political tension will encourage governments to exercise greater restraint 
when imposing AD duties.136  However, a trade instrument that is likely to 
cause political tension whenever it is used cannot possibly be considered 
good policy.  A well-designed trade instrument should not be subject to 
questions of legitimacy.  In other words, a government’s decision to restrain 
its use of AD should solely be based on an accurate analysis of the facts 
surrounding the act of dumping under clear standards and not on the fear of 
upsetting its trade partners.  
In sum, Wu’s proposal to introduce a fairness test into the ADA is likely 
to make the new AD regime subject to confusion, manipulation, continued 
misuse and abuse, increased investigation costs, and political tension.  
                                                                                                                   
 135 See generally Bhagwati, supra note 99.  
 136 Wu, supra note 1, at 167. 
482 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:457 
 
 
B.  The European Union’s Approach: Community Interest 
The EU devised a creative solution to solve the discrepancy between the 
rhetoric of AD and its actual use.  In addition to the requirement for dumping 
and injury, the EU added a third requirement: the “Community interest.”137  
This requirement is set out in Articles 7(1) and 9(4) of the Council 
Regulation No 1225/2009 with respect to provisional and definitive AD 
measures, respectively.138  These provisions essentially state that AD duties 
can only be imposed when “the Community interest calls for intervention” to 
prevent the injury caused by the particular act of dumping in question.139  
Article 21(1) of the regulation provides that the Community interest must be 
determined “based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a 
whole, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and 
consumers.”140  In Apache Footwear, the General Court decided that the 
Union Institutions have discretion to decide the method for weighing the 
interests of the various parties affected by dumping.141  
The approach taken by the EU does not represent a great departure from 
the traditional rhetoric of AD.  Its AD laws are still based on the notion that 
dumping is unfair.  Essentially, what the EU has done is to make sure that 
overall economic efficiency is considered in determining the unfairness of 
dumping.  In other words, the EU has addressed the shortfalls of other 
standards of fairness, such as the level playing field, which only focus on the 
effect of dumping on the producers, by adopting standards of fairness that 
focus on the effect of dumping on all interested parties in society.  
The EU’s approach seems both conservative and pragmatic in that it does 
not deviate too much from the existing WTO framework but addresses some 
of the economic concerns associated with abuse of dumping.  However, this 
approach is not the ultimate solution to the discrepancy problem.  Although 
the Community interest requirement adds a third barrier to imposition of AD 
duties, as Article 21(1) of the regulation and the decision in Apache 
Footwear provide, the administrators of AD are still allowed to exercise 
                                                                                                                   
 137 IVO VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCIS BELLIS, EU ANTI-DUMPING AND OTHER TRADE DEFENCE 
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wide discretion in determining what the Community interest is.  Therefore, 
the potential for manipulation and arbitrary use of the regulations still exists.  
C.  A New Rhetoric 
The problem with both Wu’s proposal and the EU’s Community interest 
approach is that they take the traditional rhetoric of AD as a given and only 
deal with the inadequacy of the regulations.  In other words, they do not 
address the problem of the existing rhetoric but rather attempt to bring the 
regulations into conformity with that rhetoric.  This means that what started 
as rhetoric has become classification.  Everyone is trapped in the notion that 
dumping is “unfair.”  
However, when the discrepancy between the rhetoric and reality is caused 
by flaws in the rhetoric, the rhetoric must be addressed first.  To address the 
problem of today’s abusive use of AD, the traditional notion that dumping is 
unfair must be abandoned completely.  Any argument for AD must clearly 
(1) acknowledge that AD is a form of protectionism and (2) prove that, 
despite its protectionist nature, AD still serves an important function in 
international trade.  
Acknowledging the protectionist nature of AD is important for several 
reasons.  First, it ensures that a proper discussion is undertaken to prevent 
abuse.  Lax legal standards can no longer be justified on the grounds that 
dumping is unfair.  Second, it eliminates the rhetorical high ground for the 
advocates of AD and ensures that all parties affected by dumping, including 
consumers and producers, can join the debate.  Third, prolonged use of AD 
will likely be seen as an unreasonable barrier to trade liberalization, and 
therefore permanent use of AD will no longer be justified.  
Even a protectionist measure can be justified if it serves a useful function.  
For example, safeguards are allowed under the WTO framework because 
they serve the important function of providing a temporary escape 
mechanism.142  The benefit of a temporary escape mechanism in trade 
liberalization has been well discussed by scholars.143  AD can also be 
justified if it serves an important function.  One of the important functions of 
AD is to provide a temporary relief from trade liberalization, i.e., a safety 
                                                                                                                   
 142 See generally THE WTO, SAFEGUARDS, AND TEMPORARY PROTECTION FROM IMPORTS 
(Chad P. Brown ed., 2006). 
 143 Id. 
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valve.  There are two models of safety valves that explain the role of AD in 
international trade.144  
1.  Political Support Safety Valve 
The first model is called the “political support safety valve.”  This model 
suggests that AD provides an effective political bargaining tool to 
governments during a time of trade liberalization.145  In other words, AD can 
be used to gain or maintain political support when a government is 
negotiating a trade agreement with another country that proposes to remove 
or reduce the existing trade barriers.  
According to Sykes’ public choice analysis of AD laws, governments 
reserve unilateral opt-out regimes against the contingency that the discrete 
effects of trade liberalization in particular sectors would result in political 
unsustainability.146  This is even true when the opt-out regimes may cause a 
negative impact on consumers that is greater than the value of the protection 
they afford to producers and result in an overall reduction in national 
welfare.147  Under the public choice theory, governments are more concerned 
about the impact of trade liberalization on producers than on consumers 
because the former are better organized and more politically influential than 
are the latter.148  
All contingent trade remedies can provide a political support safety valve, 
but AD provides a particularly effective one because of its high degree of 
selectivity.149  AD can thus be justified on the basis of its role as a political 
support safety valve helping governments relieve the political pressure 
generated by the negative consequences of trade liberalization.  
                                                                                                                   
 144 These are two of the three models of safety-value theories identified by Niels and Kate.  I 
used the same names they adopted in their article.  See Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, 
Antidumping Policy in Developing Countries: Safety Valve or Obstacle to Free Trade?, 22 
EUR. J. POL. ECON. 618, 625 (2006). 
 145 Id. 
 146 See Alan Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Cases, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 5, 18–19 (1996); see also TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 
28, at 259. 
 147 See Sykes, supra note 146, at 18–19.  
 148 Id.; see also TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 28, at 313.  
 149 According to Niels and Kate, safeguards are an imperfect substitute for AD as a political-
support safety valve because they are “more direct and less distortionary.”  Niels & Kate 
supra note 144, at 625.  
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2.  Temporary Adjustment Safety Valve 
The second model of the safety valve theory that provides support for AD 
is called the “temporary adjustment safety valve.”150  This theory states that 
when domestic producers are suddenly exposed to foreign competition, they 
need some temporary protection to “get their act together.”151  
According to Jackson, a sudden increase in imports may harm certain 
domestic producers,152 even while it benefits the whole economy in the long 
run.  Therefore, those producers facing increased competition due to imports 
are forced to adjust by either improving their competitiveness or shifting 
their resources from the production of the competing products into the 
production of non-competing ones.153  The temporary adjustment safety 
valve helps with the adjustment process by providing relief to those troubled 
producers by erecting temporary trade barriers.  
Safeguards are designed to be such a safety valve,154 but AD has long 
been “preferred” over safeguards for a number of reasons: (a) AD allows 
only particular exporters to be picked out;155 (b) the injury standard for AD is 
softer than it is for safeguards;156 and (c) AD does not have the onerous 
requirements for an unforeseen event,157 compensation,158 and maximum 
periods.159 
                                                                                                                   
 150 Id. 
 151 Id.   
 152 See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 176.  
 153 Id.  
 154 Under Article XIX of the GATT, a country may take a “safeguard action” by suspending 
GATT concessions where increases in imports “cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products.”  GATT 1947, supra note 
11, art. XIX (emphasis added); see also TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 48, at 425–27 
(discussing “theoretical rationales for the safeguard regime”).  
 155 Unlike AD, safeguards must be applied to all countries equally.  Article 2.2 of the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards (AS) provides that “[s]afeguard measures shall be applied to a 
product being imported irrespective of its source.”  Agreement on Safeguards art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter AS].  
 156 Article 4.1(a) of the AS defines ‘serious injury’ as “a significant overall impairment in 
the position of a domestic industry.”  Id. art. 4.1(a).  In US-Lamb, the Appellate Body (AB) 
held that the standard of serious injury set forth in Article 4.1(a) of the AS is much higher than 
the standard of material injury found in the ADA.  Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand 
and Australia, ¶ 124, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001).  
 157 According to Article XIX of the GATT 1947, a safeguard measure can only be adopted 
where serious injury or threat of serious injury occurs “as a result of unforeseen 
developments.”  See GATT 1947, supra note 11, art. XIX.  The AB in Argentina-Footwear 
held that Article XIX means that “developments which led to a product being imported in 
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According to Finger, Ng, and Wangchuck, AD became “the developed 
countries’ major safeguard instrument”—i.e., safety valve—by the 1990s.160  
This situation did not change much even after adoption of the Agreement on 
Safeguards in the Uruguay Round, which made safeguards arguably more 
appealing.161  AD also gained popularity among developing countries after 
the Uruguay Round.162  According to Wu’s empirical study on AD in China 
and India, the need for safety valves seems to have provided some 
motivation for initiating AD cases in at least some industries in both 
countries.163  
Wu’s study shows that, in both India and China, the industries that use 
AD laws tend to bring cases in which a tariff cut was accompanied by a 
sharp import surge.164  It is true that the safety valve model predicts that 
more AD cases will be filed after a trade barrier is removed.  However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the need for a safety valve disappears after the 
                                                                                                                   
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious 
injury to domestic producers must have been ‘unexpected.’ ”  Appellate Body Report, 
Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, ¶ 91, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14 
1999) [hereinafter Argentina-Footwear].  Article 2 of the AS states that a country may apply a 
safeguard measure to a product only if “such product is being imported into its territory in 
such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that 
produces like or directly competitive products.”  AS, supra note 155, art. 2.1.  The AB in 
Argentina-Footwear held that Article 2 of the AS means that “the increase in imports must 
have been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause ‘serious injury.’ ” (emphasis 
added).  Argentina-Footwear, ¶ 131.  
 158 Although Article XIX(3)(a) of the GATT 1947 states that a country can apply a 
safeguard measure unilaterally, it also provides that the affected countries can suspend 
“substantially equivalent” trade concessions against that country.  GATT 1947, supra note 11, 
art. XIX(3)(a).  This provision “has been interpreted as establishing a right to compensation.”  
 TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 48, at 420.   
 159 Article 7.1 of the AS provides that a safeguard action cannot be maintained for a period 
longer than four years unless the period is extended under Article 7.2.  Article 7.2 provides 
that the period may be extended if “the safeguard measure continues to be necessary to 
prevent or remedy serious injury and . . . there is evidence that the industry is adjusting.” 
According to Article 7.3, “the total period of application of a safeguard measure,” including 
the initial and extended periods, cannot exceed eight years.  AS, supra note 155, arts. 7.1–7.3. 
 160 See J. Michael Finger et al., Antidumping as Safeguard Policy 4 (The World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper Series 2730, 2001). 
 161 See Chad P. Brown, Why are Safeguards Under the WTO so Unpopular?, 1 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 47, 47–49 (2002). 
 162 See Wu, supra note 1, at 117–22. 
 163 Id. at 138, 142.  
 164 Id.  
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domestic producers completely adjust to the increased competition following 
trade liberalization.  Strategic trade theory suggests that governments often 
adopt policies to encourage particular exports or to discourage particular 
imports to promote or target certain industries that yield greater returns.165  
Such targeting can be part of a greater scheme of industrial policies 
incorporating even non-trade mechanisms, “such as low-interest loans and 
government support for research and development [programs].”166  Hence, 
the theory of strategic trade policy and the theory of industrial policy 
question the validity of the traditional notion of static comparative advantage 
and suggest that comparative advantage is in fact “dynamic.”167  
The concept of dynamic comparative advantage suggests that domestic 
producers can, from time to time, encounter unexpected increases in 
competition caused by increased productivity of foreign producers.  Such an 
increase in competition might not be as sudden as a tariff cut but can be just 
as injurious to the domestic producers because: (a) it cannot be planned as a 
tariff cut can be planned, and (b) the increase in the productivity of the 
foreign producers may continue for a long period.  A government may want 
to use a temporary adjustment safety valve to address the problem of 
dynamic comparative advantage even after trade liberalization.  
AD has at least two merits as a temporary adjustment safety valve against 
shifting comparative advantage.  First, unlike safeguards, the applicability of 
which is contingent on a sudden influx of imports, AD deals with the low 
prices of foreign goods, which are likely to be the first signal of foreign 
competitiveness.  Second, AD can be applied to those specific foreign 
producers that have already achieved a strong comparative advantage.  
Of course, the current AD regime is not a perfect safety valve because it 
was never developed with that particular intent in mind.168  However, AD is 
already used as an effective safety valve.  Therefore once the role of AD as a 
safety valve is formally recognized, it would evolve into an even better one.   
D.  Implications of the New Rhetoric 
It might be surprisingly easy to incorporate the new rhetoric into WTO 
law.  For example, a change as small as replacing the word “condemned” in 
                                                                                                                   
 165 See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 275; see also KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 96, at 
275–96. 
 166 KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 96, at 270. 
 167 See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 276. 
 168  See Finger et al., supra note 160, at 10. 
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GATT Article VI with a more neutral word, such as “addressed” or 
“remedied,” can have a significant impact.  It would also be a good idea to 
move Article VI, or the portion that deals with AD, to near Article XIX, 
which deals with temporary escape mechanisms.  
A more radical but still attainable step would be replacing the word 
“dumping” in GATT and ADA with more neutral terms such as 
“international price-differentiation (IPD).”  For example, Article VI would 
read: “International price-differentiation (IPD) . . . is to be remedied if it 
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry.”  Of course, 
then the word antidumping should be replaced, accordingly.  
These amendments would not change any substantive laws.  Therefore, 
they might be accepted by most countries without much protest.  However, 
the impact of these changes will be enormous.  First, they will eliminate the 
derogatory connotation attached to dumping, which will then remove the 
notion that countries have inherent rights in adopting AD policies.  This will 
then establish that AD is a form of protectionism that needs to be regulated 
strictly.  Once this is established, the problems associated with the lax legal 
standards in the current AD regime will become more obvious, and proposals 
will be made to address them.  Those proposals will then be accepted more 
readily because of the consensus formed by the new rhetoric.  Thus, the 
function of the rhetoric of AD as a guideline for good policymaking will be 
restored. 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS  
Wu’s reform proposal to require explanation of the unfair trade practices 
enabling dumping is founded on the legitimate concern that today’s AD laws 
are consistently misused.  AD has long been used as an ordinary means of 
protectionism in many developed countries and is likely to be used this way 
in developing countries such as China and India.  However, the manner in 
which AD is used in reality reflects the expectations of national 
governments.  Such expectations should be incorporated into the rhetoric of 
AD, not denied.  Wu’s proposal fails to address this fundamental problem 
and affirms the traditional rhetoric of AD as a sanction against unfair trade 
practices.  Such rhetoric has never properly reflected the true intention of the 
policymakers who invented AD.  It is also irrelevant to the way AD is used 
today.  Furthermore, Wu’s reform proposal will introduce the highly 
problematic and controversial concept of fairness into WTO law.  This is 
likely to create a new set of problems characterized by confusion and 
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disagreement.  Although Wu’s proposal, if implemented, might achieve 
limited success by raising the bar for applications of AD, it is not the 
ultimate solution.  
A better approach to making AD a more manageable instrument requires 
abandoning the old rhetoric based on the notion that dumping is unfair and 
promoting a new rhetoric focusing on its role as a safety valve.  The role of 
AD as a political support safety valve and a temporary adjustment safety 
valve is supported by the public choice theory, the strategic trade theory, the 
industrial policy theory, and the concept of dynamic comparative advantage.  
The new rhetoric would avoid the problematic concept of fairness and be 
consistent with the expectations of national governments.  The adoption of 
the new rhetoric in WTO law might be surprisingly easy because it does not 
deal with substantive law.  However, once adopted, it would change how 
people conceptualize AD and bring their attention to the problems associated 
with the lax legal standards governing its use.  Therefore, more proposals 
will be made to prevent the abuse of AD.  These proposals will then be 
accepted more readily because of a rhetoric that affirms the protectionist 
nature of AD.  Hence, there will be a virtuous circle. 
  

